Why We're Winning Now
Dave Price
Frederick Kagan explains why the oft-neglected qualitative shift (most news articles simply refer to a quantitative "troop build-up") of the "surge" -- protecting Iraqis -- has succeeded where previous efforts failed.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the consensus of American strategists has been that the best way to fight a cellular terrorist organization like al Qaeda is through a combination of targeted strikes against key leaders and efforts to discredit al Qaeda's takfiri ideology in the Muslim community. Precision-guided munitions and special forces have been touted as the ideal weapons against this sort of group, because they require a minimal presence on the ground and therefore do not create the image of American invasion or occupation of a Muslim country.Read the whole thing. This point cannot be made often enough -- which is probably why Michael Totten keeps mentioning this crucial piece of the new counterinsurgency strategy:
A correlative assumption has often been that the visible presence of Western troops in Muslim lands creates more terrorists than it eliminates. The American attack on the Taliban in 2001 is often held up now--as it was at the time--as an exemplar of the right way to do things in this war: Small numbers of special forces worked with indigenous Afghan resistance fighters to defeat the Taliban and drive out al Qaeda without the infusion of large numbers of American ground forces. For many, Afghanistan is the virtuous war (contrasting with Iraq) not only because it was fought against the group that planned the 9/11 attacks, but also because it was fought in accord with accepted theories of fighting cellular terrorist organizations.
This strategy failed in Iraq for four years--skilled U.S. special-forces teams killed a succession of al Qaeda in Iraq leaders, but the organization was able to replace them faster than we could kill them. A counterterrorism strategy that did not secure the population from terrorist attacks led to consistent increases in terrorist violence and exposed Sunni leaders disenchanted with the terrorists to brutal death whenever they tried to resist. It emerged that "winning the hearts and minds" of the local population is not enough when the terrorists are able to torture and kill anyone who tries to stand up against them.
Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be
1-149. Ultimate success in COIN [Counter-insurgency] is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. . . . These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.
From “Counterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.
First, the critics said we had no strategy.
Second, when we got a new strategy (new leadership, new tactics, new plans), they claimed it was no better than the old strategy (which supposedly didn't exist, but now apparently it did exist but was just as good as today's).
Third, regardless of all that, any gains or improvements are an illusion or some kind of lies promulgated by cowardly generals marching in lock-step with the BuscheneyNeocon cabal.
Fourth, none of this matters because a perfect political solution has not materialized in under six months.
Got it.
My friends in Israel explain that you really can't appreciate it, until it happens to your friends or loved ones. Managing fear becomes a way of life. You could be next.
I think in the USA, we've gotten awfully spoiled and complacent. We've watched way too many "Law &Order" shows, where, in 46 minutes, complex murders are investigaged and resolved. Either the bad guys get caught or get off on some fancy, legal maneuvering. But, that's make-believe, not the real world.
So, as I read Kagan -- a nice, clear, crisp argument -- Al-Q in Iraq adopted a primary strategy of murdering and torturing Iraqis, who assisted in any way, our reconstruction efforts.
Suicide bombs and IED's to kill soldiers; but plan 'ole barbaric butchery to kill civilians. Mix in a lotta propaganda.
I suspect in America, this turned many people off of the entire Iraqi enterprise. The gross unpleasantness caused anger and discomfort, but it was diverted towards Bush, rather than the bad guys.
Anyway, I don't KNOW if Kagan is right, but I HOPE that he is.
It does seem to me though that the political efforts to derail the War have failed. At a minimum, this War will be prosecuted until Jan 09-- 17 more months. Probably longer.
Perhaps, Congressman Brian Baird (D-Wash) will find a few more allies.
I think if the country united together to fight and win, we would do so, and then be able to de-escalate.
HankB
In a few months US forces working together with local Sunni tribes were able to clear out most of the al Qaeda militants.
An insurgence cannot succeed without the support of local people. When the local people turn on the insurgency that is when they can be defeated.
The important question is why have the local Sunni tribes been willing to work with the US now, when they were not willing 3 or 4 years ago. There are many factors. One clearly is that al Qaeda has badly overplayed its hand and turned Sunni tribes against it. Another is that the tribes have had 4 years of interaction with real Americans and they have found out that real ordinary Americans are very different from the caricature of Americans that is promoted in the Middle East. Finally, they believe that the American occupation of Iraq is coming to an end. That the US will not be keeping permanent bases in Iraq. When the US occupation ends, the Sunni realize the Iraqis will have to govern themselves. Resisting the US occupation is not as important now as positioning the Sunni for the most favorable position after the US occupation is over. The US has been training and arming the Shiites for the last 4 years. The Sunni would like the US to train and arm the Sunni too.
Sort of. We didn't even try to deal with the tribes 3 or 4 years ago; in the wake of our easy victory, there was enormous pressure to be seen as doing the "right" (i.e. democratic) thing in Iraq, as Bremer dismissed them as undemocratic relics of the past.
The US has been training and arming the Shiites for the last 4 years.
To some extent. The Iraqi Army, which gets the heavy weapons and most training, is fairly mixed. The MOI and police were mostly Shia until recently, when the Sunni tribes got on board.
Of course we all lose our tempers now and then. Dean freely admits to being imperfect in this regard, which is why regulars to this establishment will generally be cut more slack than people who we don't know very well.
Still: behave like an adult, or go find somewhere else to play. Thanks.