atomic principles
Aziz P
(cross-posted at City of Brass. Note I've categorized this article as "Philosophy" rather than "The War" here at DW.)
on the origin of the word, atomic, from the Greek atomos:
In Greek, the prefix "a" means "not" and the word "tomos" means cut. Our word atom therefore comes from atomos, a Greek word meaning uncuttable.
the problem with discourse is that we tend to load up our ideas with detail. This results in people who might actually share the same underlying principles to disagree vociferously on an issue because they perceive the other side to be opposed to the common aim. A good example is the "not anti-war but on the other side" trope that gets bandied about against lefties on the topic of Iraq.
the way it should work instead is that we articulate the basic - "atomic" - principles, and then evaluate policy against them. That evaluation can take many forms, though I personally ascribe to the methodology that demands that the means by which the desired end is achieved match in full the principles and values that defined said end. In other words, as I have argued before, the ends do not justify the means - and the means actually influence the ends. But absolutism on principle is also detrimental to success; perfection is the enemy of the good.
The process of defining principle first, defining end goals in accordance with those principles, and then devising means that both stay within the boundaries of those means AND (critically) actually achieve the desired end, is what I call "principled pragmatism". Part of the pragmatism comes from acknowledging that there is tension in the criteria for means, between principle and success; finding the right policy therefore requires human judgment, and intelligence, and knowledge. Only thus can the degree to which the two criteria are compromised be minimized. And compromised they inevitably are to some extent.
The above might be more succinctly summarized as,
principled pragmatism (PP): (a) the means influence the ends, but (b) perfection is the enemy of the good.
Here is where the need for atomic principles comes in. Principles that are too detailed ("Bush is Hitler"; "abortion is murder"; "The US is a rogue state"; "liberals are objectively pro-terrorist"; "not anti-war, but on the other side", etc) result in making it impossible to articulate effective policy. In other words, overly specific (and dogmatic) principles violate PP(b). Further, policy derived from such principles ultimately end up violating PP(a). For the requisite degrees of freedom needed to navigate the space of policy and principle without violating PP, we must have principles that are broader in scope, leaving human judgement and reason in control at the implementation level rather than blind obedience to dogma.
Of course, principle can't be so broad as to be devoid of meaning. "evil is bad" comes to mind. There needs to be a targeting of the idea towards a specific issue. This is far easier said than done, but the guiding light here can again be the "atomic" characteristic. Atomic principles literally must serve as building blocks, which can be rapidly assembled into more complex structures.
On Plato's theory of atomism:
Plato's Timaeus ... elaborates an account of the world wherein the four different basic kinds of matter—earth, air, fire, and water — are regular solids composed from plane figures: isoceles and scalene right-angled triangles.
What atomic principles might we articulate, then? Remember, these are principles, not axioms; disagreement is inevitable, and even beneficial! In the context of recent events, here are some I start with:
- Direct military intervention, including ground troops, are a moral obligation upon nations with the capability thereof, with regards to ongoing genocide and massacres.
- "With great power comes great responsibility" applies to nations as well as men; lack of direct self-interest in either case is not sufficient to excuse inaction.
- Lasting regime change for the purposes of liberalization/democratization can not succeed if driven primarily by foreign military intervention.‡
- Democracy is an end-product of liberalization, not an initial condition.
Upon these principles, rest pretty much my entire opposition to the specific implementation of the Iraq War by the present Administration, my support for almost all the Democratic presidential candidates over any GOP counterpart, and my increasingly weakening stance on maintaining a sizable troop contingent in Iraq for any length of time (though on the latter point, I still am against "withdrawal" as preferentially defined by the mainstream left). But disagreement on these issues of policy is far less fruitful than disagreement on the atomic principles above.
Incidentally, this essay more rightly belonged at Nation-Building blog, but Google robots have declared it to be a spamblog and thus it has been suspended pending review. I don't know how long that will take or even whether it will turn out in my favor but I do hope that 4 years of blogging there aren't consigned to /dev/null. My fate is in Google's hands. This was the final straw; I will be moving City of Brass off Blogger and cease using blogger entirely in the near future.
Related essay: the means influence the ends at City of Brass
‡acknowledgements: Daniel H in comments to a previous post for inspiration, and Chris Landsdown for subsequent correction.
Related Posts (on one page):
So one of your principles is that Saddam Hussein is still in power in Iraq? The American Indians still rule America? Hitler's government is still in charge of Germany? The military still rules Japan with the Emperor as a figurehead?
It's a pretty bad sign when one of your principles, as stated, is blatantly false.
You might want to rephrase that one.
Vietnam wasn't foreign military intervention? Sure, the US was merely defending people, but Vietnam was never a unified country in the past. It was in fact three nations, with three different peoples that didn't like each other too much. But the Chinese eventually won and imposed their Regime on Vietnam, and look at that, military intervention was a success because the other side (the US) ran away in utter disgrace.
So, there are two data points dripping with naked military force being the primary means of enforcing regime change. I'm sure I could go dig up some more that directly disprove your 'principles.'
What was that one line out of Heinlein? "Force has solved more problems than anything else?"
Elisha, I dont think WW2 was about regime change for its own sake, though that was certainly a side effect. Hitler was a threat to us and our allies; he attacked first, we fought back. Keep in mind that I misphrased that princple and will revise accordingly; obviously what i wrote is wrong as presently stated, as Chris pointed out.
While I agree that too detailed of a principle can lead to problems in application, I don't think the problems of those "principles" is their detail.
It's that they're not principles held in common and thus cannot be used as a basis for further application.
In fact, more detail is sometimes needed to reach a common principle. For instance, try out "killing is wrong". Some will agree but some won't agree. Try out "killing is wrong except to protect innocent life" and you'll get a better principle even though it's a more detailed principle.
Lasting regime change for the purposes of liberalization/democratization can not succeed if driven primarily by foreign military intervention.
I reject it because it is never driven primarily by foreign military intervention. It is always driven primarily by the human desire for freedom. But people who believe it is true dramatically understate that desire. Just stating the principle is a way to steer the debate by attempting to make a false claim an axiom underlying your non-axiomatic principle.
I furthermore reject it because it is an excuse not to address root cause.
Yours,
Wince
Who is the primary driver, in terms of planning (timing, methods, etc.) and expenditure, behind the current regime change war in Iraq? The US or the Iraqis?
The problem I frequently have is that people tend to assume that I'm bundling a bunch of (unstated) ideas along with the ideas that I'm actually expressing.
I'm not certain that #3 and #4 are atomic in the sense in which you're using the word nor am I certain that they're principles. They look more like axioms or, more likely, conclusions derived from atomic prinicples that aren't here.
I have a number of questions. Is this enumeration sufficient?
What are the relative priority of these principles?
Are you implying that we have a moral obligation to invade China?
Now, you must be implying there is some largescale ongoing massacre in China. I'm not denying it, but can you be more detailed? I suppose even principle 1) of Aziz's needs to be weighed against the probability of success. If we are talking about China engaging in widescale slaughter on residents on a specific area that could easily be separated from the rest of China by a "wall" of foreign armies and airforces, then yes, we should do such a thing -- sorta like dividing Kurdish Iraq from the rest of it after GWI. But if what you are talking about is random arrests of political dissidents spread throughout China, then the only solution would be foreign-led regime change, which Aziz rejects, and rightly in my opinion because the likelihood is that the costs will greatly outweight the benefits.
Dave, I think that regime change in China is what is needed; in that sense two of my principles contradict as pertains there. More editing required, obviously. Suggestions?
Moral obligations are moral obligations; they don't partake in cost/benefit analysis.
That China kills enormous numbers of its own citizens on an annual basis is neither a speculation nor an exaggeration. It's a matter of record. China admits to more than 100,000 civil disturbances annually which are generally put down with force. Are we distinguishing between “democide” and genocide?
that said, the "pragmatism" part does sugest that relatively low-hanging fruit like Darfur be prioritized over the tougher nuts; doing so would increase overall human liberty, and arguably help long term.
and, one might as well concede that military regime change of China is flat-out impossible. Its going be near impossible with respect to Iran; with China there's no possibility we can do it. None. So the question is moot. Remember that the goal of atomic principles is to devise policy towards ends. We have a moral obligation to intervention of some sort; if military intrevention is off the table, then we need to find other leverage poles of power. And of those we have many.
i do need to revise principle 1 of my list. will think about it some more.
By my standards, then, preventing ongoing genocide is not a moral obligation. It's more like a mitzvah (in the sense of an act of kindness).
The previous comment and the following is in the context of working towards a better presentation of the atomistic philosophy and a separation (for better treatment) of two different concepts here.
The two concepts are:
Both worthwhile and potentially deep concepts. However, I think there's a problem in the execution in this essay.
First, the identified principles at the end are not atomistic (uncuttable). The first two because they beg the question of "why?" - the last two because they are really empirical assertions and thus are falisifiable.
For example:
Why is it a moral obligation to intervene in genocides?
Why does the atomistic principle "with great power comes great responsibility" apply to nations? Why is self-interest removed from consideration?
In the first case, there's several constitutent principles which makes it non-atomistic. Specifically, there's the principles of:
As I just cut it into 4 parts, it's not atomistic. (I can do something similar for the second)
On the last two - they're not so much principles but assumptions as to how the world works, which means they're really implicit answers to empirical questions. In fact, there's empirical evidence to the contrary for both 3 and 4 (see Panama for principle 3 and see Great Britain for 4). That being said, I think 4 is close to an accurate statement, but for accuracy, I would rewrite it as "Democracy is strongly correlated with liberalization" but again that's more an empirical assertion than a principle.
As to the second topic, my suggestion for what makes for a good set of principles is the following:
a) the right amount of detail (lest it loses applicability) - the subject of this post
b) the right amount of commonality (too little and there's basis of action, too much and you'll soon have no principles left)
c) measurable (necessary if you want evaluation against the principles)
d) self-explanatory (needed for atomism - if it constitutes many parts, then you don't have an atomic principle)
So I like the concepts, I just think the essay needs work.
no, I am arguing for a genuine obligation ot action. whether that action is military or not is the part that needs to e edited - but there is indeed an obligation, not mitzvah.
jodi, you are right that my principles can be cut, but those constiutuent pieces are not foundations for policy. Hence, mine are atomistic in the policy sense.
also, did not exclude self-interest; I said that lack of it is not enough of an excuse to do nothing. Theres no reason that we cant tailor our actions to try and meet our self interest to some degree thogh.
Sigh. Japan. Germany.
- Democracy is an end-product of liberalization, not an initial condition.
Democracy is a kind of liberalization, not an end-product of liberalization. Also, democracy is itself usually a liberalizing process.
The Iraqi people, by orders of magnitude. There are 22 million Iraqi people in Iraq. There are is one hundred times as many as the Americans in Iraq. The Iraqis, through the planning (timing, methods, etc.) and expenditure in their normal daily grind, dwarf the efforts of the Americans.
Yours,
Wince
The Iraqis have more troops, sovereignty, and are spending a much larger % of GDP. The U.S. only drives military operations because the Iraqis lack capability.
What I really hate about this principle is that it seems to very transparently exist only to tar the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as failures, despite the fact we have successfully created relatively liberal democracies in both countries. It is supported by no evidence and seems a classic case of choosing a principle to fit the desired conclusion.
Tom Hawkson is my Dean's World nom de plume, since Dean wants fake names which sound real. Wince (aka Wince and Nod) is my nom de plume everywhere else. My real name? Not telling.
Iraq is pretty clearly primarily a military-driven effort at implementing a liberal democracy in Iraq.
Oh, agreed, from the perspective of the American government. But it isn't the primary driver towards lasting regime change for the purposes of liberalization/democratization. And it never has been, even from the perspective of the American government. The military effort can only remove obstacles to that lasting regime change. The primary driver in Iraq is the demonstrated love of the Iraqi people for human freedom.
In short, the military effort will succeed as long as it concentrates on creating the natural conditions from which an Iraqi liberal democracy will rise on its own.
Yours,
Wince
Not by the later stages of the war he wasnt; we could have negotiated a peace once we had the upper hand (in fact Germany offered, and was refused), but proceeded with regime change instead. Nor was Japan a threat once her Pacific fleet lay at the bottom of the sea and her shipyards lay in ruins; their defense was deliberately planned to inflict enough casualties to force a negotiated peace.
We also democratized Italy by force, and you could even include France in that list, since we overthrew the Vichy gov't.
Sorry, regime change for the purpose of democratization not only works, it works extremely well, better than any other method (though at great cost).
First: "transparently exists only to tar the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as failures"? Really? Aziz I think is honestly interesting in directing future policy.
Second: "despite the fact we have successfully created relatively liberal democracies in both countries"? There is no way to call Afghanistan and Iraq successful -- it is way too soon to tell how lasting either polity will be.
Finally (though he can correct me on this if I'm wrong), but doesn't Aziz support US efforts in Afghanistan (as I do)? Why would he want to tar an effort he supports?
Yes there is. They've passed liberal onstitutions and held free and fair elections. Whether they last is a function of whether we put forth the effort to keep them going till they can stand on their own.
but doesn't Aziz support US efforts in Afghanistan (as I do)?
Not according to his principle!
I updated that comment to elucidate:
It is supported by no evidence and seems a classic case of choosing a principle to fit the desired conclusion. This is actually how people generally think; they reach conclusions emotionally and then rationalize them.
Forgive me for doubting that anyone was walking around in 2000 insisting that despite the evidence of France, Italy, Germany and Japan, no military intervention could create liberal democracy.
Well, everyone seems to have their own theories, back with their own (selective) evidence. Can we not come up with some hypotheses and agree on a methodology to test them instead of just approaching this in a rhetorical and unscientific manner?
BTW, Italy was not forcibly democratized, as far as I can tell. A referendum was held on order by the king, and Italians chose a republican form of gov't over monarchy. Neither was Turkey, Spain, Greece, Russia, Argentina, Mexico, or even the US, (though we were aided by the French and many other Europeans, including Poles) democratized by force.
But seriously, let's compile a list of all democracies, and we can test:
1) Dean's hypothesis that most democratizations happened with the aid of foreign military aid.
2) Aziz's hypothesis that no lasting democracy has been established when the effort was led by foreign powers for the primary purpose of regime change/democratization/liberalization.
and
3) Dave's hypothesis that the most successful democracies were established by foreign led efforts at regime change (among other purposes).
A priori, I think we can agree that 1) is a middle ground before 2) and 3). 2) and 3) are logically incompatable, while 1) can go with either 2) or 3). And though I haven't thought about it much, they probably don't span the universe of possibilities, i.e it is possible that 1), 2) and 3) are all false.
Funny. Those exact same principles are reasons I support the Iraq effort.
Sigh. Name me a U.S.-led military regime change for purpose of creating democracy that failed.
Neither was Turkey, Spain, Greece, Russia, Argentina, Mexico, or even the US, (though we were aided by the French and many other Europeans, including Poles) democratized by force.
Not relevant to the principle. No one is saying military regime change is necessary for democratization, or at least I'm not.
BTW, Italy was not forcibly democratized, as far as I can tell.
Yes it was, they were invaded and surrendered to the Allies in 1943. They were a fascist government until that invasion happened, and would have continued being fascist had it not happened. It was regime change. Yes, there was internal support, but that's been true in every other country too, including Iraq and Afghanistan.
If you want to reach agreement via axioms and principles you will have to avoid axioms and principles which your political opponents are going to reject out of hand. This is difficult. We are all used to people trying to reach a pre-determined position by manipulating the terms of discussion. Some of your principles appear to do this, although I do not believe that is your intent.
Your biggest problem in trying to limit the uses of military force is the historical example of Hitler and Tojo, but you might also add the historical example of the Confederacy. The Americans did force democracy on Germany and Japan, and we did so in an extraordinarily brutal way. We did so to the Confederate States of America (who voted to secede!) in much less brutal, but still brutal way.
You are going to have a hard time contending that America was wrong to fight these wars and end them as we did, and you will have a hard time trying to draw useful distinctions which don't break down under scrutiny. After all, your opponents on this blog have long contended that the differences between our policy in Iraq and that we took in WWII have been intended to avoid the brutality of WWII. Which makes them features, not bugs. Let's face it, WWII was a horrible failure, simply because of the massive loss of human life. By that standard FDR is the worst President, ever, and Woodrow Wilson is the second worst. Bush hardly rates.
So, in less you can carry the historical basis of your principles further back in time and cover the broad swath of human history - not just the Western history with which I am more familiar - we aren't going to reach the sort of axiomatic principles you seek.
It's a very commendable effort and I thank you for it. I don't think I would be up for it, myself.
I recommend How to Stop a War: The Lessons of Two Hundred Years of War and Peace by Jim Dunnigan and William Martel.
Yours,
Wince
Aziz's principle, as it stands is:
I would say our purpose in Afghanistan was (and is) the elimination of an enemy who has, either directly in the case of al-Qaeda, or indirectly in the case of the Taliban, attacked Americans (and many others) on American soil. The success of liberalization/democratization is up to the Afghans. Though we can help to a certain extent, that is not our primary purpose there. We did not wake up one day and say, ohmigod, the Taliban oppresses its people, let's help them. Rather, we said, those b&*&#$&s attacked us, continue to support al-Qaeda, who are dead set against us and not backing down anytime soon, and we have to do something about it. That is proper military policy, in my opinion. But it is not a proper use of our military (in terms of dollars and lives) to keep searching the globe for other illiberal regimes to overthrow. In terms of my judgment, but again, I think we should all review the historical facts, most nations have democratized mostly on their own. Occasionally, like in the very special cases of Germany and Japan, foreign-led regime change is successful, and can lead to democratization. But these episodes, in my opinion, are not easily generalizable, and thus do not make for good policy. Further, as in Afghanistan, the primary purpose of our actions in WWII were defeat of an enemy who had attacked us (Japan) or one who was allied with an enemy who had attacked us and had attacked allies of ours (Germany).
Now you're just splitting hairs, exceedingly fine ones at that.
But it's easy to show why that's wrong: we didn't just put the Northern Alliance in charge and say "Enjoy your new country fellas! Dmeocracy? Who cares?"
Occasionally, like in the very special cases of Germany and Japan, foreign-led regime change is successful,
Again, name me a U.S.-led military regime change for purpose of creating democracy that failed.
Then you should be glad we're not doing that. But Aziz's principles seem to call for exactly that:
We should note that all three could be true. If we state them as you did they are not mutually exclusive.
Gut reaction: 2) and 3) are false. They try to explain too much and generalize too much with too little data.
1) has enough wiggle room it is probably true.
For example, Great Britian became a democracy and I suspect you can find a historical example of some outside monarchy giving military aid to a democratizing force. In fact, I suspect one example is this: William of Orange - a foreign Prince with military power - became King of England in the Glorious Revolution which established the power of the Parliament over the King.
Certainly an effort at regime change, certainly involving a foreign power, certainly involving military victories and certainly supported by freedom lovers in Britain.
Did Cromwell have foreign military assistance against Charles?
3) has enough wiggle room it might be true - see the word most.
2) is weak. It is an attempt to prove a negative. That's hard! Luckily there are a small number of attempts, but we already appear to have counter-examples.
Yours,
Wince
But you are blurring regime change and democratization. Italy was not forcibly democratized, but our military defeat of Italian armies did help the Italian king overthrow the fascist government. Democratization, on the other hand, was an Italian-directed process.
Well, many of the "democracies" established after WWI failed spectacularly, and certainly Wilson led the effort in that process, even though most of the heavy-lifting in countries such as Syria and Iraq, as well as the African Mandates, was done by Europeans. And, if we move away from U.S.-led interventions, we can include many other failures, like France in Algeria, South-east Asia, Britain in Pakistan, Burma, Nepal.
Yes it's very relevant to your principle, as you stated
If it is "better", then you must compare methods; the comparison cannot be irrelevant to proving your principle. It is, on the contrary, essential.
So: Germany, Japan, Italy, France, Panama.
The Allied invasion was both intended to remove the regime and necessary for its removal.
Well, many of the "democracies" established after WWI failed spectacularly
That wasn't US-led, either. In fact, the U.S. specifically objected to the terms widely regarded as the reason they failed.
then you must compare methods
You're not comparing methods, you're just listing countries that liberalized without U.S.-led military regime change. Are you asserting that Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, Saddamist Iraq, Talban Afghanistan, etc., could have been democratized more effectively by non-military means?
And Italy (at least) should come off your list.
Keep trying though, you might find one somewhere.
I am suggesting that we only attack countries that have attacked us or our allies, and that if these attacks weaken the regimes to the point where the people of these countries overthrow their regimes (as with Italy and Serbia, though I have some problems with how the Serbian campaign was led, though that's beside the point), so much the better. I do not know whether Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or Taliban Afghanistan would have democratized more or less successfully or not if we had not attacked them. The point is that we attacked them for purposes other than democratization.
Further, I am a Kantian. I believe if we approve of a US policy, then we have to be prepared to accept other countries carrying out that policy. Thus, we must look at the success of democratization efforts led by other countries than just the US.
Myths of the Gulf War
From 1998.
Yours,
Wince
Careful, now you're bringing Iraq into the equation -- and Iran, China, N Korea, and others.
I do not know whether Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or Taliban Afghanistan would have democratized more or less successfully or not if we had not attacked them.
LOL I think we can safely hazard a guess.
The point is that we attacked them for purposes other than democratization
Again, democratization was obviously part of the reason, as evidenced by the fact we did democratize them. That was never the ONLY factor in any war.
Further, I am a Kantian. I believe if we approve of a US policy, then we have to be prepared to accept other countries carrying out that policy.
Well, my sympathies for your dilemma, but as an American exceptionalist I am under no such contraints.
What about Iran, 1953? Well I guess that wasn't for the purpose of creating democracy. Actually, there are probably so few examples because our leaders are usually wise enough to not to go there.
After several defeats, Italy was invaded in June 1943. In July 1943 King Vittorio Emanuele III and a group of Fascist leaders staged a coup d'etat against Mussolini, having him arrested.
Anyways, the Italian timeline is mostly irrelevant; the proximate cause of regime change and guarantor of a liberal replacement was undeniably the Allied forces, unless you're going to try to claim the war and revolution were just unrelated coincidences.
We didn't invade South Vietnam or Iran.
Keep looking though!
Yes, I'm sure Mossadegh was just having the CIA over for tea.
"Name me a U.S.-led military regime change for purpose of creating democracy that failed"
Wasn't military, wasn't creating democracy.
And the distinction between military and CIA is dubious as the CIA takes on many military activities.
The answer may be found here:
In CONGRESS, July 4, 1776.
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands, which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Moral obligation
My understanding of an obligation is that obligations exist outside the calculus of cost and benefit. When I owe money to the bank, for instance, that paying it back may not be convenient, easy, or even safe to my well-being is irrelevant. I owe it anyway. That's what an obligation is.
nations with the capability thereof
What does “capability” mean in this context? Is Germany capable or incapable? Germany doesn't have the military capacity to prevent a genocide in Estonia let alone in Darfur. That's by design (both theirs and ours). They spend less than 2% of GDP on their military, rapidly heading for 1%. If refusing to spend money on your military avoids an obligation, then it's not an obligation.
ongoing genocide and massacres
This is a problem, too. Doesn't it just suggest that, if the government of a country wants to kill its citizens of a particular ethnicity, race, etc. it should do it as quickly and thoroughly as possible? Once a genocide isn't ongoing, i.e. it's been accomplished, that would mean the threat has passed. Somehow that doesn't seem to make sense to me.
Further, doesn't it suggest that, for example, we had an obligation to invade Iraq to prevent the massacre of the Kurds and Marsh Arabs?
Please note that I'm not rejecting principle #1. I don't understanding it well enough to know whether I accept it or reject it.
I think cost/benefit analysis does figure in, but only in a certain way. For instance, if you believe that intervening will save many lives, then you believe the cost to the people of the country your are invading is far outweighted by the benefit to that country. But you are right that costs and benefits (to those in the country doing the invading) should be less important. Unfortunately, however, for a government with a limited budget, everything must be justified with some cost/benefit calculus, which is one reason why no government can be perfectly moral.
the actions of the Janjaweed in Darfur
the treatment of Coptic Christians in Egypt
the treatment of the Kurds by Saddam Hussein
the treatment of the Marsh Arabs by Saddam Hussein
the treatment of the Chechens by the Soviets (then by the Russians)
the treatment of the Tibetans by the Chinese
the treatment of the Uighurs by the Chinese
the treatment of the Hmong people by the Vietnamese
the treatment of the Karen in Myanmar
Predictability is a weakness that can be exploited. In the words of Patton at Kasserine Pass, "I read your book!". In the words of Sun Tzu, "if you are far away, let your enemy think that you are close at hand."
Reagan was very effective with his words. I believe one of his most effective speeches was the one with "I have just signed legislation outlawing the Soviet Union". In just a few words he demolished efforts to predict him. In setting out a course of apparent insanity, he set the stage for Boris Yeltsin to say those same words and make them stick.
I'm not an American exceptionalist, but I have something useful to say.
International law exists. It is useful. But it isn't very useful for the purposes where people wish to apply it. It is very different from normal law. So different that that the use of the word law to describe it is very misleading. Frequently international dream or international hope would be a better description. All the important laws governing U.S. military forces, for example, are actual national laws which can be enforced. International law itself has no real enforcement. How about 'International Non-Binding Resolution'?
Do you believe in international law, DanielH? If so, what are the characteristics of international law which cause you to believe in it? Do you think the phrase 'international law' is an appropriate description, or is it misleading?
I think the Unitied Nations should be replaced with something that isn't unethical, immoral and disgusting like the current institution. Oh sure, it's useful, and it's built on noble goals, but it would be more useful if it never commented as a body on any international issue. It's good to have a place where diplomats can meet. It's apparently bad to allow them to pretend they are a legislative or deliberative body.
I can think of one reform which would improve the UN. Require all votes to be unanimous. That's the way treaties are worked out. Everyone has to agree.
The UN was intended to institutionalize the alliance which won WWII. It failed almost immediately and has never become successful since. That FDR! Bush is looking better again.
DanielH, what is the use of the UN?
Yours,
Wince
It suggests that Jefferson is the father of American exceptionalism and the Declaration of Independence establishing US sovereignty a first
act thereof. International law concerns relations with sovereign nations and the treaties and such thereof.
An alternative question might be: Is a nation that is not a signatory to an international treaty in violation of international law when it acts contrary to that law or when it interprets the law differently than other nations ?
McKiernan, the document stated that people everywhere have the right to overthrow tyranny, not that the American people have the right to overthrow tyranny anywhere (no matter how the people living under such "tyranny" perceive it). And why is that the founding document of American "exceptionalism"? It says "all men are created equal" not "Americans are created more equal.
Wince, yes I believe in international law, though like you I believe it is more nebulous than something like, say, British common law. Also I think the UN is flawed and in need of reform -- I've been thinking about this a lot, but I have no great answers (yet).
That said, I think internatioal law (however nebulous) and "American exceptionalism" are incompatible. The rule of law assumes that everyone, or in the case of the law of nations, every nation, is treated equally. American exceptionalism says that America gets to do things other nations cannot, meaning we are not subject to international law.
Actually, American exceptionalism means that when someone has to take action to enforce international law, it's usually us. It also says that we make a good faith effort to comply with international law even when we don't have to, and even when we know the opposition isn't.
he responded with
You might check out:
Exceptionalism
and
American exceptionalism
On the other hand, international law is not a function of some global government that exerts sovereignty over all the nations although it does involve relationships between sovereign nations.
On the other:
Those latter seem to be "normal rules, general principles, or the like" to me.
Those latter seem to be an articulation of what the "normal rules, general principles, or the like" should be.
What a ridiculous assertion. What do you suppose we had planned for post-Taliban rule of the country? Or do you think the thousands of people in the Pentagon and State Department never considered it? Why isn't the Northern Alliance ruling the country as warlords instead of elected leader Karzai?
Honestly Aziz, I'm disappointed. You're smarter than this.
Huh? First off, there was no military campaign in Iran, just a CIA plot -- and the CIA plot was to remove an elected leader; there's no way to argue it was in any way a failed attempt to create democracy through military-led regime change. By contrast, the Allied campaign in Italy was always meant to overthrow the fascist government and replace it with something more amenable. Again, what do you suppose the allies would have done if another fascist regime had replaced it? A very poor argument.
The rule of law assumes that everyone, or in the case of the law of nations, every nation, is treated equally.
Which is why it's morally indefensible. Kim Jong Il doesn't represent North Koreans, he brutally represses them. Ditto Castro.
Rule of law applies to people, not the sometimes convenient fictional creations we call nation-states. Under any international law that makes moral sense, Kim Jong Il and Fidel Castro are criminal that should be arrested, not untouchable sovereigns.
But "something more amenable" simiply means a less anti-American regime. Again and again you present false dichotomies. There are plenty of non-fascist, non-anti-American political arrangements that are far from democratic. In fact, our history of supporting regime change (from anti-American elected governments to non-democratic dictatorships/monarchies) in Chile, Iran, Nicaragua, and others, plus our active bolstering of non-democratic regimes in the Middle East such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, shows that we care much more about whether a regime is anti-American or not than whether or not it is democratic. If the Italian population, in its 1946 referendum, had chosen monarchy, we would have done nothing. Please show some proof, not based on hindsight evidence, that we intended to democratize Italy.
Similarly, I'd be willing to be there were numerous administration officials who contemplated a "Return of the King" in Afghanistan.
Of course we all lose our tempers now and then. Dean freely admits to being imperfect in this regard, which is why regulars to this establishment will generally be cut more slack than people who we don't know very well.
Still: behave like an adult, or go find somewhere else to play. Thanks.