On the Record with IDF Intelligence
Michael J. Totten
I spoke recently with an Israeli Defense Forces intelligence officer about last summer’s war between Israel and Hezbollah in South Lebanon. He still serves in the IDF and therefore must remain anonymous. I’ll call him David, which isn’t his name.
David works in a fire control unit stationed in the Northern Command. During the war he managed intelligence pertaining to Hezbollah rocket fire, selected targets for air and artillery strikes, and occasionally assisted in real-time control of fire. He is familiar with some of the high-level decision-making and hints at some of what he knows that is officially classified.
MJT: Let's start with a general question. What, exactly, did Israel accomplish in the summer war with Hezbollah? Are there any tangible lasting benefits?
David: Well, to understand what was accomplished we need to look at the starting point. Virtually all Israelis were very happy the IDF withdrew from Lebanon -- many think it was foolish to have gotten in there in the first place and even those that don't agree we overstayed our welcome, so to speak. Following the pullout Hezbollah established itself very firmly in South Lebanon -- of particular worry to the military was their ground-ground rocket and missile array, ranging in various calibers and ranges. I cannot go into all the intelligence data, but Hezbollah's capability to hit Israeli population centers was well known for quite some time. So this was the primary problem -- only it was never tackled by any Israeli leadership, not that there was much that could have been done. That remains a problem today, though from what I hear they're having a much more difficult time restoring their abilities. I wouldn’t call it a success story, though. The problem's still there. Another worry was Hezbollah's attempts at kidnapping Israeli soldiers.
There have been several attempts made, and each one was more calculated and planned than the last. Apart from the famous instances in which IDF soldiers did in fact die or get kidnapped, there was one memorable attempt that was foiled due to good thinking and alertness in the tactical levels. There were also "anti-aircraft” barrages that hit inside Israel, killing one boy in one instance if I recall correctly. Hopefully, the last conflict sent a message that will make these acts less desirable.
There were also general shows of force at the border, usually organized "demonstrations" or throat-cutting gestures at soldiers from armed persons. There's a road that passes a few meters from the border and they made sure to build a position right on top it with Hezbollah flags, just as a gesture. We no longer have Hezbollah right on the border, and that is the most tangible benefit.
An interesting analytical observation.
I'm not so sure though that it will be true in the future.
I know some people operating with the intention of developing a multi-national database of cell, guerilla, rogue regime and smuggled missile and rocket types, fire patterns, etc.
Eventually it is hoped that by determining type to use patterns and attack locale spreads that a system can be developed for predicting mobile set-up points so as to anticipate next fire probability geographies. That is by tracking attack and in-flight patterns and analysis in motion (if possible) you can then predict those geographic locales most likely to be used for the next or a similar attack given range, time to set-up, probable target, internationality of attack (terrorism against civilian targets, military objectives, mobile assets, etc.)
Assuming the IDF does not already use such methodologies, or have not recently updated their current predictive systems, then such a system might be useful especially along border areas with shorter range rocket arsenals.
Of course a lot about usage patterns will be determined by enemy training procedures and in field operational tactics.
But most terrorist organizations and smaller cell operatives use similar hit, disengage, and immediate reset in a nearby locale until they actually are able to make a successful strike. Assuming the first strike fails, and many do, then if you can anticipate the next assembly point you are likely to make a successful kill and dissuade further attacks on the same target. At least for that round of attacks anyhow.
I've heard pretty much the same from my friends and contacts.
As for demolishing their base of operations I think that was a short term psychological victory but they could always recoup, and I suspect they may, by dissolving centralized command and developing decentralized, semi-autonomous sectional commands or even cell structures similar to Al Qaeda. If I were them I would. It will cause a command-control-communications problem but they can operate within an sovereign nation without having to operate like Al Qaeda in Iraq within a conflict zone and therefore they can be more leisurely about communications and preparations. It will disperse control and break apart communications but that can be compensated for especially given logistical support from Iran and given modern technology.
I wouldn't be surprised to see them start to develop far more complicated command and communications and technology structures and specializations over the next few years and forego immediate guerilla operations in an effort to develop a sort of shadow, compensational technologies arsenal and support networks to overcome logistical and technological weaknesses in their last assault.
I've got to bug for an appointment. Sorry about the disjointed nature of my response, I was writing under a time constraint.
Godspeed in your work.
Of course we all lose our tempers now and then. Dean freely admits to being imperfect in this regard, which is why regulars to this establishment will generally be cut more slack than people who we don't know very well.
Still: behave like an adult, or go find somewhere else to play. Thanks.