This conflict was never out of control as far as Iran is concerned. They control the heights of the flames, and they made sure to extinguish them when they thought the price to continue was too high.
An interesting analytical observation.
I'm not so sure though that it will be true in the future.
I know some people operating with the intention of developing a multi-national database of cell, guerilla, rogue regime and smuggled missile and rocket types, fire patterns, etc.
Eventually it is hoped that by determining type to use patterns and attack locale spreads that a system can be developed for predicting mobile set-up points so as to anticipate next fire probability geographies. That is by tracking attack and in-flight patterns and analysis in motion (if possible) you can then predict those geographic locales most likely to be used for the next or a similar attack given range, time to set-up, probable target, internationality of attack (terrorism against civilian targets, military objectives, mobile assets, etc.)
Assuming the IDF does not already use such methodologies, or have not recently updated their current predictive systems, then such a system might be useful especially along border areas with shorter range rocket arsenals.
Of course a lot about usage patterns will be determined by enemy training procedures and in field operational tactics.
But most terrorist organizations and smaller cell operatives use similar hit, disengage, and immediate reset in a nearby locale until they actually are able to make a successful strike. Assuming the first strike fails, and many do, then if you can anticipate the next assembly point you are likely to make a successful kill and dissuade further attacks on the same target. At least for that round of attacks anyhow.
Perhaps their hands were tied by the politicians, but no one can deny a major part of the blame lies on the Chief of Staff's neglect of the regular military, which was very eroded by policing the territories and later evacuating the settlers from Gaza, without any sort of rehabilitation afterwards.
I've heard pretty much the same from my friends and contacts.
As for demolishing their base of operations I think that was a short term psychological victory but they could always recoup, and I suspect they may, by dissolving centralized command and developing decentralized, semi-autonomous sectional commands or even cell structures similar to Al Qaeda. If I were them I would. It will cause a command-control-communications problem but they can operate within an sovereign nation without having to operate like Al Qaeda in Iraq within a conflict zone and therefore they can be more leisurely about communications and preparations. It will disperse control and break apart communications but that can be compensated for especially given logistical support from Iran and given modern technology.
I wouldn't be surprised to see them start to develop far more complicated command and communications and technology structures and specializations over the next few years and forego immediate guerilla operations in an effort to develop a sort of shadow, compensational technologies arsenal and support networks to overcome logistical and technological weaknesses in their last assault.
I've got to bug for an appointment. Sorry about the disjointed nature of my response, I was writing under a time constraint.
Godspeed in your work.
3.8.2007 4:09pm
Commenting on Dean's World is a privilege, not a right. Dean is your host, you are his guest, and you should behave in that fashion. Dean is not your babysitter, nor is he your punching bag. Please remember this. In general, you are free to disagree with anyone on any subject you wish, but abusive behavior will not be tolerated.
Of course we all lose our tempers now and then. Dean freely admits to being imperfect in this regard, which is why regulars to this establishment will generally be cut more slack than people who we don't know very well.
Still: behave like an adult, or go find somewhere else to play. Thanks.
An interesting analytical observation.
I'm not so sure though that it will be true in the future.
I know some people operating with the intention of developing a multi-national database of cell, guerilla, rogue regime and smuggled missile and rocket types, fire patterns, etc.
Eventually it is hoped that by determining type to use patterns and attack locale spreads that a system can be developed for predicting mobile set-up points so as to anticipate next fire probability geographies. That is by tracking attack and in-flight patterns and analysis in motion (if possible) you can then predict those geographic locales most likely to be used for the next or a similar attack given range, time to set-up, probable target, internationality of attack (terrorism against civilian targets, military objectives, mobile assets, etc.)
Assuming the IDF does not already use such methodologies, or have not recently updated their current predictive systems, then such a system might be useful especially along border areas with shorter range rocket arsenals.
Of course a lot about usage patterns will be determined by enemy training procedures and in field operational tactics.
But most terrorist organizations and smaller cell operatives use similar hit, disengage, and immediate reset in a nearby locale until they actually are able to make a successful strike. Assuming the first strike fails, and many do, then if you can anticipate the next assembly point you are likely to make a successful kill and dissuade further attacks on the same target. At least for that round of attacks anyhow.
I've heard pretty much the same from my friends and contacts.
As for demolishing their base of operations I think that was a short term psychological victory but they could always recoup, and I suspect they may, by dissolving centralized command and developing decentralized, semi-autonomous sectional commands or even cell structures similar to Al Qaeda. If I were them I would. It will cause a command-control-communications problem but they can operate within an sovereign nation without having to operate like Al Qaeda in Iraq within a conflict zone and therefore they can be more leisurely about communications and preparations. It will disperse control and break apart communications but that can be compensated for especially given logistical support from Iran and given modern technology.
I wouldn't be surprised to see them start to develop far more complicated command and communications and technology structures and specializations over the next few years and forego immediate guerilla operations in an effort to develop a sort of shadow, compensational technologies arsenal and support networks to overcome logistical and technological weaknesses in their last assault.
I've got to bug for an appointment. Sorry about the disjointed nature of my response, I was writing under a time constraint.
Godspeed in your work.
Of course we all lose our tempers now and then. Dean freely admits to being imperfect in this regard, which is why regulars to this establishment will generally be cut more slack than people who we don't know very well.
Still: behave like an adult, or go find somewhere else to play. Thanks.